This paper examines a special episode in communication practices of the Swiss National Bank (SNB) when short-term interest rates reached the zero bound. A particular feature of SNB communication policy at the time was to talk openly about alternative policy instruments despite the fact that they were never implemented. Non-sterilized FX interventions were frequently mentioned as a potential instrument. We ask how did financial markets respond to the SNB's repeated references of non-sterilized interventions? The empirical results with high frequency data provide strong evidence that SNB intervention references depreciated the domestic currency for several hours. The case study supports the view that communication is an effective tool for monetary policy.
Introduction
The empirical literature on communication strategies for exchange rates has until now worked only with broad definitions of verbal interventions. Verbal interventions are statements by central bank officials that either support or undermine the domestic currency without necessarily referring to central bank interventions. Fratzscher (2005 Fratzscher ( , 2006 , de Haan (2005, 2007) , and Fatum and Hutchison (2002) use an indicator function to filter positive and negative statements by ECB officials and others in reference to the euro. The evidence is mixed. Jansen and de Haan (2005) , using high frequency exchange rate data, find little or no response, while Fatum and Hutchison (2002) , using daily data, identify an asymmetric reaction. Other studies by Beine et al. (2004) and Fratzscher (2005 Fratzscher ( , 2006 , using a GARCH specification for daily data, show that verbal interventions reduce exchange rate volatility.
One source for the empirical discrepancy is the verbal intervention indexes. The indexes are constructed using a broad search for newswire reports with reference to specific names of central bank officials and the U.S. dollar or the euro. The selected reports are then interpreted subjectively as being references of currency support or currency neglect. Despite using sim-1 ilar search algorithms and similar samples for the euro, studies by Fratzscher (2005 Fratzscher ( , 2006 , Fatum and Hutchison (2002) , and Jansen and de Haan (2005) do not work with the same number of verbal interventions.
1 Further, all supportive references are assumed to generate similar market reactions. No attempt is made to separate weak references from strong references. A possible solution is to narrow the focus on strongly worded statements that make a clear reference to foreign exchange interventions. We set out to do this.
The objective of this paper is to examine the financial market's response To test these hypotheses, we first construct an index of intervention references 1 For (daily) verbal interventions over the period 1999 to around 2002, Fatum and Hutchison (2002) find 36 statements, Jansen and de Haan (2005) 127 statements, and Fratzscher (2005 Fratzscher ( , 2006 79 statements.
2 based on newswire reports. Next, event study analysis is used to determine whether our narrow definition of intervention references corresponds with high-frequency movements in the exchange rate.
Our empirical analysis examines a special episode between 2002 and 2005 where the Swiss National Bank (SNB) made references on the potential use of FX interventions. The SNB intervention references refer to the unconventional policy of non-sterilized interventions and should be viewed as communicating a new policy option when interest rates are zero.
2 Our study thus extends the empirical literature by and . These studies, which rely on theoretical work by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and others, argue that communication is an effective tool in shaping policy expectations when nominal interest rates are close to or equal to zero. Fed references of policy inclinations about the future path of interest rates are able to move asset prices. Our contribution is to extend the empirical literature on communication effectiveness at the zero bound beyond the United
States and Japan to a small open economy setting, Switzerland.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section two discusses the intervention references index and the empirical methodology. Section three presents the main empirical results. Section four offers concluding remarks.
Institutional aspects, data, and methodology
This section begins with institutional aspects of Swiss intervention references. The discussion is important for understanding the SNB's communication strategy during a period when short-term interest rates reached their lower bound. Next, the intervention reference index is presented. Then, a discussion of the empirical methodology based on the event-study approach follows.
3 The Swiss practice of referring to non-sterilized interventions at the zero bound was dismissed by the Federal Reserve and the Bank of Japan as a viable policy option. This was because the legal competence to intervene lies with another institution and the fear that political problems with trade partners could arise, see Bernanke (2002) and Clouse et al. (2000) for the United States and Ito (2004) and Ito and Mishkin (2004) for Japan.
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Institutional aspects of SNB intervention references
Since January 2000, the SNB's policy framework may be characterized as inflation forecasting with a floating exchange rate, see Baltensperger et al. (2007) . The policy framework includes the following. The main objective of the SNB's monetary policy is price stability. The SNB has no exchange rate objective. To achieve price stability, the SNB sets a target range for the three-month Libor rate. Adjustments to the target range are motivated by the SNB's consensus inflation forecasts. To steer the Libor rate within the target range, the SNB uses the one-week repo as its operational instrument.
Within this framework, the exchange rate only matters to the extent that it can threaten price stability to the upside or to the downside.
A mystery about SNB intervention references is, given the SNB's policy It may be argued that both explanations sought to "shape policy expectations" for the Swiss franc. They do this by increasing the probability of the event that the SNB will undertake further expansionary measures. Similar explanations are advocated by and . They argue that the communication of future policy actions is the only effective tool to influence medium-term expectations when short-term rates are close to or equal to zero. 6 A communication policy at the zero bound needs to convince markets of alternative policy options. It may be argued that (whether intended or unintended) SNB intervention references did this. Several intervention references explicitly state that non-sterilized interventions will augment market liquidity in the medium term. This in turn will increase inflationary expectations, weaken the Swiss franc, and improve real economic activity through higher net exports.
Intervention reference index
To construct our intervention references index, we rely on newswire reports from Factiva. 7 Three considerations guide the construction of the index. 8 The first decision defines the information space to be searched. We Semantic Analysis, is used to identify common themes in FOMC minutes. Our objective restricted ourselves to newswire reports that mention the SNB, with reference to foreign exchange intervention. Each newswire report contains the words "intervention", "intervenes", or "intervening" and was required to have a clear connection with the Swiss franc. A large share of the newswire reports directly quote SNB officials from speeches, interviews, and press releases.
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In five instances, we also included newswire statements that interpret SNB intervention references to mean a foreign exchange intervention without direct reference to the original text or direct quotation of the SNB official. A second decision in constructing the intervention reference index is to limit the time range of the newswire reports to normal trading hours for the Swiss franc-euro exchange rate. All newswire reports with a (Zurich) time stamp outside of normal trading hours (i.e., before 8:00 and after 16:00) were excluded. This is done because trading in the CHF/EUR is not continuous differs from this approach in that it seeks to offer a specific definition of verbal interventions and test its stimulus. 9 We assume that the newswire report responds equally to interviews, speeches and press statements. Fischer and Zurlinden (1999) show that the SNB interventions before 1995 were often around 10:00 and 15:00 (periods when the interbank market is most liquid).
About 45% of the intervention references fell in these hours.
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and neglective intervention references are given in Table 1 . Table 2 shows the distribution of the intervention references. They are classified as the number of SNB intervention references for a given day, the number of SNB references, and all intervention references. The latter references include SNB references plus intervention references from various agencies (i.e., IMF, OECD, and Swiss Finance Ministry) and market analysts.
These intervention references, which do not necessarily cite official sources, were constructed in the same manner as SNB intervention references. The effectiveness of the two types of intervention references will be tested in the next section.
A striking feature of the distribution in Table 2 and supportive references were identified). Third, the motivation for the intervention references focused on external factors attributed to the euro in the earlier period as opposed to domestic factors attributed to deflationary fears in the later period. In the run up to the euro's introduction in 1999 and after, the SNB and other Swiss institutions expressed concern that the euro would depreciate against the Swiss franc, see Fischer (2002) , Rich (2000) , and the SNB's press release from 11.12.98. Again, this is less problematic in our study, in that we restrict ourselves to strongly worded statements with reference to foreign exchange interventions.
Last, our narrow focus on specific intervention references allows us to identify precisely the exchange rate response. This represents an improvement over indicator procedures used by Kohn and Sack (2002 ), Fratzscher (2004 and others that transform broad qualitative references into a +/-1 index, or factor procedures by and Gürkaynak et al. (2004) that attempt to identify whether the latent monetary surprise is defined by more than one common component.
Exchange rate data and empirical methodology
Our objective is to examine the high frequency movements in the Swiss 14 franc-euro exchange rate to strong and supportive intervention references.
Let IR j denote the intervention reference, where j is the date and γ(j)
gives the sequential order of the intervention references for γ(j) = 1, . . ., J number of intervention references. To capture the market response to SNB intervention references, we use intra-daily quotes at ten-minute intervals up to 48 hours. The intra-daily exchange rates, which are taken from the SNB's dealer room, were mid prices between bid and ask quotes. To evaluate the effectiveness of intervention references, we apply the event study methodology by Fatum and Hutchison (2003) and use the direction criterion to make references about the effectiveness of the SNB's communication strategy at the zero bound. 14 The test for direction defines a successful inter- 13 We did not find strong evidence that the median spread behaved differently before and after an intervention announcement and versus the median daily spread between 2002 and 2005. Issues of announcement effects and exchange rate volatility are not investigated in this study. 14 Intervention studies that use the event study approach by Fatum and Hutchison (2003) frequently group several foreign exchange interventions as one event. This is done to avoid simultaneity problems where foreign exchange intervention reacts to exchange rate
and i denotes a ten-minute interval for i = 1,· · ·, N . The direction criterion measures whether, after an intervention reference, the Swiss franc depreciates against the euro.
A non-parametric sign test is used to calculate the likelihood of the direction criterion, see Fatum and Hutchison (2003) for motivation and discussion.
We set our choice of the probability of the event to 0.50. 15 Such a probability is consistent with a random walk without drift for the direction criterion.
Further, we use an independence test based on the success ratios to test various hypotheses of sample break or type of intervention reference.
changes. For example, top management often gives the central bank's trading desk the discretion to intervene for several days. In our setup we treat each SNB intervention reference as an event. We assume that the market is reacting to unanticipated news resulting from the SNB intervention references unleashed by a SNB governor. The other two criteria of smoothness and volatility reduction are not considered since they are not frequently mentioned in the zero-bound literature. 15 We also considered the expected probability defined by the sample. However, this had no bearing on the outcome of the empirical results. For example, there were more appreciating than depreciating changes in the Swiss franc-euro exchange rate (measured by changes in our 10 minute ticks). This meant that the expected probability set at 0.5 is a more stringent hurdle to reject the null.
Empirical results
This section presents empirical results on the financial market's response to SNB intervention references. Our main result, presented in the next subsection, shows that the Swiss franc depreciates against the euro for several hours after an SNB intervention reference. 16 After establishing the robustness of our main result, the empirical analysis focuses on the following questions.
Does the communication of SNB intervention references differ from market
intervention talk? Is the first reference more important than the subsequent ones? Is the zero interest rate period distinct from the low interest rate period?
The market responds to SNB intervention references
To motivate our empirical focus on SNB intervention references for the post-event (post-reference) period, we begin by plotting exchange rate movements at the time of the SNB intervention references. Figure 2 shows the (ln) change in the Swiss franc-euro exchange rate three hours before and after an SNB reference on exchange rate interventions. All six categories defined in Table 2 are plotted for comparative purposes, despite substantial differences 16 The main results were also performed for the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen and are consistent with those presented for the euro. These results are available from the authors.
in the number of observations, see Table 2 . Intervention references, which are denoted as strong and supportive in Figure 2 , show that the exchange rate depreciates just under 0.3% within an hour and is slow to revert to the level at the time of the announced intervention reference. The same reaction responses to intervention references show no clear evidence that markets are reacting in anticipation of the time stamp of the release -a phenomenon that arises in intervention studies, see Peiers (1997) and Dominguez (2003) . 17 Dominguez and Panthaki (2007) and Fatum and Pederson (2007) argue that FX markets respond faster to scheduled news than non-scheduled news. The latter includes (oral)
interventions. This conjecture assumes that scheduled news tends to be better anticipated and more quickly interpreted by the market than non-scheduled news. The lagged response to SNB intervention references is thus consistent with the evidence in Fatum and Pederson (2007) . Using intradaily data between 2002 and 2004, they find that the DKK/EUR exchange rate responds about 30 minutes after to the intervention news.
The second measure, labelled macro, controls for important macro information in Switzerland and in the euro area. If a release date for CPI, industrial production, unemployment, GDP, import and export prices and volume, and PPI fall on the same day that a SNB intervention reference was made, then it is dropped from the sample. 18 This variable allows us to control for whether auxiliary information or SNB intervention references are driving our main result. Dominguez (2003 Dominguez ( , 2006 finds that exchange rates respond stronger to central bank interventions in combination with macroeconomic news than when interventions are executed in the absence of macroeconomic news. There are 56 observations for our macro measure.
The third measure, labelled IR-only, considers whether the newswire report refers only to interventions. Often SNB board members have made intervention references in combination with an assessment of the Swiss and European economy (i.e., forecasts and risks). The ability to separate such information from intervention references is particularly important when interest rates are close to zero. The IS -only variable has 38 observations.
The last measure, seasonal adj ustment, controls for intra-daily seasonality. Andersen et al. (2003) , Dominguez (2006) , and others find strong evidence of intra-daily seasonality for foreign exchange rates, and argue that it is necessary to control for this deterministic pattern when modelling exchange rate movements with a GARCH process. To control for intra-daily seasonality, we correct our non-parametric test by first calculating a mean average of Δs j,t+i for each 10 minute tick for the 2002 to 2005 period. This mean average is then used in place of the zero restriction for our direction test.
The results in Figure 3 show that different variants of intervention references lead to the same result: the Swiss franc depreciation against the euro is significant at the 90% level after 40 minutes when an SNB intervention reference is made. The duration of the exchange rate movement depends on the specified measure. The evidence shows that the measures controlling for macro news and seasonality follow the profile of our original index for intervention references for the first four hours. Thereafter, slight differences arise; however, all three series are no longer consistently above the 90% level.
Instead, for the other indexes, headline and only intervention news, the significance levels exhibit some weakness between the second and fourth hour and thereafter follow the original index closely. The low number of observations for headline and IR-only is an explanation for the slight differences in the results with respect to the original index.
SNB intervention references versus market intervention talk
It is important to distinguish between what is said and who says it. For this reason we examine the role of the SNB intervention references and market intervention talk. The latter references are constructed in the same manner as SNB intervention references. This time, however, the newswire report cites the IMF, OECD, Swiss government officials, and dealers/analysts. The first three agencies called on the SNB to intervene, whereas the analysts speculated whether the SNB would conduct an intervention. 19 The number of market intervention references is all references minus SNB references in Table 2 .
The results of the direction tests in Figure 4 provide strong evidence that the Swiss franc depreciates after an SNB intervention reference. The significance level of rejecting the null is greater than 95% after 40 minutes. This 19 We only focus on whether the two sorts of references have different effects, because the amount of interaction between the two is limited. SNB intervention references and market intervention references do not fall on the same day.
result is also supported by evidence from the success ratios (i.e., the number
Δs j,t+i > 0 divided by the number of intervention reference).
They are almost always above 60%, see Figure 4 .
The evidence for market intervention talk is at odds with the empirical results for SNB intervention references. The level of significance of rejecting the null hypothesis that the Swiss franc does not depreciate after a market intervention reference is never above 90% after 20 minutes. This evidence is also supported by the weaker success ratios compared to those of the intervention references. We interpret the evidence from Figure 4 as follows.
The source of the intervention references matters. The FX market responds only to SNB intervention references.
Is the effect of the first announcement stronger?
This question is motivated by the observation in Fischer and Zurlinden (1999) that FX markets react stronger to the first SNB foreign exchange intervention than to the following interventions on the same day. A further aspect is the observation that repetition is a problematic feature in empirical analysis based on newswire reports. Recurring reports increase the number of observations, yet it is unclear whether markets respond to older reports that restate the same information in a different manner. To avoid interpre-tation problems of identifying repetitive cases, we examine the influence of the first SNB intervention reference for a given day versus SNB intervention references that follow on the same day. We use an independence test, χ 2 (1) distributed, to examine the null hypothesis that the success ratios of the first SNB intervention reference equal the success ratios of the following SNB intervention references on the same day. The success ratios for the direction criterion are based on the exchange rate movements that span the 10 minute to 6 hour range after an intervention reference is made.
The independence tests find that the first SNB references behave similar to the repeated references. The significance levels of rejecting the null are shown in the second column of Table 3 . The significance levels always lie below 90% for the different event windows, except for two instances. We interpret this evidence to mean that repetitive newswire reports do not diminish the impact of SNB intervention references.
Are references more important when interest rates are zero?
Next, we ask whether a communication policy of intervention references is equally effective when interest rates are zero as opposed to when they are 
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The evidence based on the independence tests is unable to reject the null hypotheses of sample equality. Column three of Table 3 provides significance levels of rejecting the null that the success ratios of the two samples are the same for the direction criterion. The significance level is greater than 90%
for the direction criterion in only one instance (i.e., after six hours). Our interpretation of the evidence is that the exchange rate response to SNB communication on FX interventions was equal for the low and zero interest rate environment.
Conclusions
Our objective is to examine the financial market's response to SNB intervention references at the zero bound. Sign tests for direction criterion: SNB versus market talk 37
